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POSSESSION: THE REQUISITES FOR
AND ADVANTAGES OF THE
APPOINTMENT OF A TRUSTEE IN
CHAPTER 11 PROCEEDINGS
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One of the most significant changes effected by the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 19781 (Code) involved the consolida-
tion2 of Chapters X (Corporate Reorganization), XI
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1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 [hereinafter
cited as Pub. L. No. 95-598]. For an enlightening discussion of the entire legislative
process surrounding the adoption of the Bankruptcy Code, see Klee, Legislative His-
tory of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DE PAUL L. REv. 941 (1979), reprinted in 54 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 275 (1980).
2. The synthesis of Chapters X, XI and XII of the Act into an integrated Chapter
11 reflects the important and underlying input of the Commission on Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States (Commission). The movement for comprehensive reform
of the bankruptcy laws can easily be traced to Senator Quentin Burdick's proposal to
create the Commission. The original resolution, S.J. Res. No. 100, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967), was introduced on August 2, 1967. The resolution creating the Commis-
sion was finally adopted on July 24, 1970, and the Commission was formed to "study,
analyze, evaluate, and recommend changes" in the Bankruptcy Act. Act of July 24,
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468. After several years of intensive study and
hearings, the Commission issued its two-part report in July, 1973, REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No.
137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT]. The first
part of the COMMISSION REPORT contained the recommendations and findings of the
Commission, while the second part consisted of the text of a proposed bankruptcy
code [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION BILL], which was later introduced as H.R.
10792 and as S. 2565 in the 93d Congress, Ist Sess. (1973), and as H.R. 31 and S. 236
in the 94th Congress, 1st Sess. (1975).
The specific recommendation to consolidate the rehabilitation chapters of the Act
was rooted in the Commission's concern that, because there were no bright line stan-
dards to differentiate Chapter X from Chapter XI, the existence of several chapters
for reorganization merely frustrated the rehabilitation process by involving the parties
in collateral battles, most notably the costly and time consuming litigation over mo-
tions to convert the Chapter XI case to one under Chapter X. See COMMISSION RE-
PORT, .rupra, at 241-48. See also Moller & Foltz, Chapter 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy
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(Arrangements), and XII (Real Property Arrangements) of
the Bankruptcy Act (Act). In sweeping fashion, Congress
created a unified reorganization chapter that is fundamen-
tally grounded in the presumption that pre-bankruptcy man-
agement will continue to operate the business following the
filing of a petition for relief.4 Concomitantly, however, Con-
gress legislatively recognized the need for displacing the dis-
honest or grossly incompetent debtor in possession by
creating a mechanism by which interested parties could seek
the appointment of a trustee. In a very real sense, therefore,
the Bankruptcy Code creates an inherent tension between
the debtor who desires to remain in possession of its business
and the creditor or other interested party who seeks to sup-
plant the current management of the failing concern with a
disinterested trustee.
The resolution of this tension presents interesting and
sometimes conflicting questions of legislative history7 and
Code, 58 N.C.L. REv. 881, 882-84 (1980). See generally Coogan,A Debtor's Choice of
a "Chapter"Rehabilitation Proceeding Under the "BankruptcyAct," 1 VT. L. REV. 117
(1976); Weinberg, Bankruptcy Rehabilitation: The Decision to File and the "Choice of
Chapters," 12 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 680 (1977).
The subsequent House Report accompanying H.R. 8200 criticized the divergent
practices under Chapters X, XI and XII in even stronger terms, characterizing the
distinctions between the chapters as "irrational" and stressing the need for a "flexi-
ble," consolidated reorganization chapter. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., Sess. 221-
24 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5963, 6180-83 [hereinafter
cited as HousE REPORT]. Thus, the Bankruptcy Code, as enacted, reflects a signifi-
cant departure from prior practice in the way that it consolidates the provisions deal-
ing with reorganization.
3. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, amended by the Chandler Act,
ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-598).
4. The very structure of Chapter II dictates this conclusion in the way that sec-
tions 1108 and 1107 interrelate. Section 1108 provides that, unless the court orders
otherwise, the trustee may operate the business. Section 1107, in turn, vests the debtor
in possession with all the rights and powers of a trustee. See generally In re Curlew
Valley Assocs., 14 Bankr. 506, 509-11 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (Judge Mabey provides
an excellent analysis).
5. The mechanism is found in 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1982).
6. One commentator has suggested that, because of the inherently adversarial
nature of proceedings involving the displacement of current management, the trustee
appointing mechanism in Chapter 11 has failed, partly because the adversary process
itself does not create enough incentives to creditors to oppose the continued operation
of the business by the debtor in possession. See LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Con-
trol-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code? (First Installment),
57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 114 (1983).
7. See infra notes 14-49 and accompanying text.
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judicial construction, 8 ultimately calling for the balancing of
competing reorganization policies.9 Section 1104(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code effectuates this balance. Athough much
has been written about the operation of the Bankruptcy
Code, very little has been said about the appropriate param-
eters of section 1104(a) of the Bankruptcy Code'0 and the
potential use of that provision to displace the overreaching
debtor in full control.
8. See infra notes 52-109 and accompanying text.
9. See infra Part III and accompanying notes.
10. The most complete analysis of section 1104(a) is probably contained in 5
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1104.01-.03 (15th ed. 1982). A number of other writers
have also considered section 1104. See generally Aaron, The Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978: The Full Employment-for-Lawyers Bill, 1979 UTAH L. REv. 1, 17-19, 22-23,
27-28, reprinted in 22 CORP. PRAc. COMMENTATOR 199, 220-22, 227, 233 (1980); Anal-
ysis of the Bankruptcy Reform,4ct of 1978, 1979 ANN. SutRV. BANKR. L. 197, 345-46;
Bare, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 47 TEN. L. REv. 501, 521, 575-77, 598
(1980); Bisbee, Business Reorganization Practice Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, 28 EMORY L.J. 709, 717-18 (1979); Coogan, Broude & Glatt, Comments on
Some Reorganization Provisions of the Pending Bankruptcy Bills, 30 Bus. LAW. 1149,
1156, 1162 (1975); DeNatale, The Creditors' Committee Under the Bankruptcy Code -
.4 Primer, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 43, 53 (1981); Downey, Ferriell & Pfeiffer, The Pro-
posed Bankruptcy Reorganization Provisions. A Comparison of the Current Law with
Chapter 11 of H.. 8200 and S. 2266, 18 SANTA CLARA L. Rnv. 567, 589-91 (1978);
Elfin, Business Reorganization Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 12 PAC. L.J. 163, 165-
67, 171-72 (1980); Hughes, "Wavering Between the Profit and the Loss'" Operating a
Business During Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the New Bankruptcy Code, 54
AM. BANKR. L.J. 45, 51-61 (1980); King, Chapter 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, 53
AM. BANKR. L.J. 107, 114-18 (1979); Klein, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 53
AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 10-11 (1979); LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Fail-
ure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code? (Second Installment), 57 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 247, 257-66 (1983); MacDonald & Newman, Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code:
A Primerfor Montana Attorneys, 43 MONT. L. REv. 1, 13-14 (1982); Moller, Chapter
11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code or Whatever Happened to Good Old Chapter XI?, I1
ST. MARY'S L.J. 437,447,460-62 (1979); Moller & Foltz, supra note 2, at 882-84, 910-
12; Poorman, Commentary, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 32 OKLA. L. REv. 583,
596 (1979); Replansky & Becker, Consumer Bankruptcy and the Creditor, 13 U.C.C.
L.J. 291, 305 (1981); Rosenfeld & Lee, Bankruptcy, 2 CORP. L. REv. 339, 342-43
(1979); Silberman, Rehabilitation and Reorganization Under the New Bankruptcy
Code, 41 ALA. LAW. 133, 134 (1980); Trost, Business Reorganizations Under Chapter
11 of the New Bankruptcy Code, 34 Bus. LAW. 1309, 1313-17 (1979), reprinted in 1980
ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 165, 169-72; Trost & King, Congress and Bankruptcy Reform
Circa 1977, 33 Bus. LAW. 489, 529-31, 534-35 (1978); Note, Business Reorganization
Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of1978: An Analysis of Chapter 11, 1979 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 961,971-73; Note, The Misbehaving Debtor: The Asset Wasting Debtor in Posses-
sion Under Chapter11, 1980 ANN. SuRv. BANKR. L. 473, 477-79 [hereinafter cited as
Note, The Misbehaving Debtor].
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This article will examine the dimensions of section
1104(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. After exploring the legisla-
tive history of that Code provision and briefly contrasting
the former practice under the Act," the article will trace the
emerging judicial construction of the operative language in
section 1104(a),12 focusing upon the use of a motion for the
appointment of a trustee as an important arrow in the credi-
tor's quiver of rights. Finally, the article will outline the ad-
vantages in seeking the appointment of a trustee.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
Section 1104(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides, in per-
tinent part:
At any time after the commencement of the case but
before confirmation of a plan, on request of a party in in-
terest, and after notice and a hearing, the court shall order
the appointment of a trustee-
(1) for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompe-
tence, or gross mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor
by current management, either before or after the com-
mencement of the case, or similar cause, but not including
the number of holders of securities of the debtor or the
amount of assets or liabilities of the debtor; or
(2) if such appointment is in the interest of creditors,
any equity security holders, and other interests of the es-
tate, without regard to the number of holders of securities
of the debtor or the amount of assets or liabilities of the
debtor. '3
As enacted, section 1104 "represents a compromise be-
tween the House bill 14 and the Senate amendment' 5 concern-
11. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 52-109 and accompanying text.
13. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1982).
14. The House bill referred to in this passage is H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977), which was originally introduced by members of the Subcommittee on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary on July 11, 1977.
See generally Klee, supra note 1, at 281-82.
15. The Senate amendment referred to in this passage is the Senate version of
H.R. 8200. Consistent with normal Senate parliamentary procedure, after the Senate
considered the House version of H.R. 8200, the Senate struck the entire text of H.R.
8200, save for the enacting clause, and inserted the text of S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1978), as amended, which was the Senate bill. Thus, the Senate amendment
simply refers to the Senate version of H.R. 8200, and is perhaps more accurately
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ing the appointment of a trustee or examiner." 1 6
Notwithstanding this deceptively simple statement, the legis-
lative history of section 1104(a) is marked by strong clashes
of opinion and policy, causing at least one noted textwriter
to observe that "very few issues dealt with by Congress in
connection with the drafting of the Code produced a greater
divergence of views than the standards for the appointment
of trustees."17 Congress struggled over numerous issues, in-
cluding whether to require the appointment of a trustee in
every case,' 8 and whether the relative size of a debtor corpo-
described as the "Senate amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 8200."
Klee, supra note 1, at 288-89.
16. 124 Cong. Rec. 32,392 (1978) (floor statement of Representative Don Ed-
wards on the passage of the House amendment to the Senate amendment in the na-
ture of a substitute to H.R. 8200) (footnotes added); 124 Cong. Rec. 34,005 (1978)
(floor statement of Senator DeConcini on the passage of the final Senate amendment
in the nature of substitute to H.R. 8200). See also In re McCordi Corp., 6 Bankr. 172,
176 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Eichorn, 5 Bankr. 755, 757 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980);
Hotel Assocs., Inc. v. Trustees of Cent. States S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund (In re
Hotel Assocs., Inc.), 3 Bankr. 343, 345 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980).
17. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 10, T 1104.01, at 1104-3. See also
Smith v. Concord Coal Corp. (In re Concord Coal Corp.), I1 Bankr. 552, 553 (Bankr.
S.D.W. Va. 1981). For a representative sampling of the divergent views expressed on
the issue of the appointment of a trustee, compare the statements of Securities and
Exchange Commissioner Philip A. Loomis, Jr., and Leonard M. Rosen, Esq., of the
New York City Bar, in the Hearings on H. 31 and H 32 Before the Subcommittee
on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4, 2152, 2153-54, 2175-80, 2474, 2475 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on H.A 31 and H.A 32].
18. The House and Senate Reports dealing with the narrow issue of whether to
appoint a trustee in every case graphically illustrate the extent to which the leading
proponents of the Bankruptcy Code differed. The House Report favored a flexible
approach that did not require the appointment of a trustee in every reorganization
case, citing the abuses engendered by the then existing Chapter X and Chapter XI
schema. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 104, 232-34 and 402-03, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6065-66, 6191-94, 6357-59. Rather, the House
version of the Bankruptcy Code required the bankruptcy court to consider the ap-
pointment of a trustee on a case-by-case basis. Id. In contrast, the Senate Report
accompanying the original Senate version of the Bankruptcy Code, S. 2266, mirrored
the concerns of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and favored the mandatory
appointment of a disinterested trustee in cases involving a "public company." S. REP.
No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 9-11, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5787, 5795-97 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. A "public company" was
defined to mean "a debtor who, within 12 months prior to the filing of a petition for
relief under this chapter, had outstanding liabilities of $5 million or more,. . . and
not less than 1,000 security holders." S. REP. No. 95-598, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-11,
115, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5795-97, 5901. See also
Levy, The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Judicial Functions
Under the Bankruptcy ReformAct of 1978, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 29, 29-34 (1980). The
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ration or the fact that it is publicly owned is relevant to the
determination of whether "cause" exists to appoint a
trustee. 19 Ultimately, Congress opted for an admixture of
the House and Senate versions of the Bankruptcy Code in
that "[t]he method of appointment rather than election, is
derived from the House bill; [and] the two alternative stan-
dards of appointment are derived with modifications from
the Senate amendment, instead of the standard stated in the
House bill." 20
Because neither the House Report2 1 nor the Senate Re-
port22 deal with versions of section 1104(a) that were actu-
ally enacted into law, it is all the more important to
understand the contextual development of section 1104(a).23
provisions requiring mandatory appointment of trustees contained in the Senate ver-
sion of the bill were deleted from the final version of the Bankruptcy Code. See 124
Cong. Rec. 33,990, 34,004-05 (1978).
19. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 9-11, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 5795-97; HouSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 402-03, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6357-59. In view of the deliberate if somewhat cumbersome language of
section 1104(a)(l), "but not including the number of holders of securities of the
debtor or the amount of assets or liabilities of the debtor," there can be no doubt that
Congress expressly rejected any standard based upon "such arbitrary factors as the
number of stockholders or the amount of assets and liabilities." Smith v. Concord
Coal Corp. (In re Concord Coal Corp.), 11 Bankr. 552, 553 (Bankr. S.D.W. Va. 1981).
The only remnant of the "public company" concept is now found in the provisions
governing the appointment of an examiner. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(b) (1982). Reflecting
the compromise which occurred between the terms of the final House bill, which pro-
vided that an examiner would be appointed only if the protection of a trustee was
needed and the costs and expenses were not disproportionately high, and the terms of
the final Senate bill, which required the appointment of a trustee in the case of a
"public company" and permitted the appointment of an examiner in the case of non-
public company if the appointment would serve the interest of the state and security
holders, section 1104(b), as enacted, provides that an examiner must be appointed if
"the debtor's fixed, liquidated, unsecured debts, other than debts for goods, services,
or taxes, or owing to an insider, exceed $5,000,000." 11 U.S.C. § 1104(b)(2). Com-
pare the final House Bill, H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1104 (1977), with the
final Senate Bill, S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1101(3) (1978) (defining Public Com-
panies). Compare also HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 402-03, 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6358-59, with SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 115, 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5901. See generally Hughes, supra note 10, at 52-
55.
20. 124 Cong. Rec. 32,405, 34,005 (1978); see also supra note 16 and accompany-
ing text.
21. See supra note 2.
22. See supra note 18.
23. Numerous courts have astutely observed that, because both the House and
Senate Reports dealt with versions of section 1104(a) that were not enacted into law,
there is very little relevant legislative history on section 1104(a). See, e.g., Flushing
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Like many other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the
mechanism providing for the appointment of a trustee in a
Chapter 11 case is deeply rooted in the recommendations,
findings and proposal of the Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States 4.2  Dissatisfied with the uneven
and often arbitrary approach to the appointment of trustees
under the Act,25 the Commission recommended that the ap-
Say. Bank v. Parr (In re Parr), 1 Bankr. 453, 457 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd on
other grounds, 3 Bankr. 691 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); In re Eichorn, 5 Bankr. 755, 757 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1980); Hotel Assocs., Inc. v. Trustees of Cent. States S.E. & S.W. Areas
Pension Fund (In re Hotel Assocs., Inc.), 3 Bankr. 343, 345 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980). In
the opinion of these authors, however, it would be imprudent to limit one's examina-
tion of the legislative history of section 1104(a) to the floor statements of Representa-
tive Don Edwards and Senator Dennis DeConcini on the final passage of the
Bankruptcy Code. If for no other reason, the House and Senate Reports are surely
useful in indicating what the authors of the respective House and Senate bills in-
tended when they drafted those bills, and more importantly, what the members of the
House and Senate had in mind when they finally enacted the Bankruptcy Code.
24. See generally supra note 2. The Commission consisted of nine members:
three appointed by the President and two each by and from the Senate, House and
Judiciary. The Presidential appointees were Harold Marsh, Jr., J. Wilson Newman
and Professor Charles Seligson. Senators Quentin N. Burdick and Marlow W. Cook
were appointed by the President of the Senate. Representatives Don Edwards and
Charles E. Wiggins were appointed by the Speaker of the House, and District Judges
Edward Weinfeld and Hubert L. Will were appointed by the Chief Justice. Professor
Frank R. Kennedy served as executive director of the Commission.
25. See generally supra note 2. The Commission was troubled by the way the
structure of the reorganization chapters under the Act contributed to costly and time-
consuming litigation, often because a putative debtor sought mightily to avoid being
automatically displaced by the requisite appointment of a trustee under Chapter X.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 241-48. The Commission found that the
rehabilitation chapters of the Act have "detailed and overlapping rules regarding
[their] availability which frequently produce pointless and wasteful litigation as to
which chapter should be utilized in a particular case. . . . In addition, none of the
chapters is precisely suited to the needs of many common business situations." Com-
MISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 23.
To understand the basis for the Commission's concerns more fully, it may be help-
ful to digress briefly by juxtaposing the former practice under the Act. Under Chap-
ter X of the Act, the bankruptcy court was required to appoint a trustee in every case
where the debtor's noncontingent, liquidated liabilities exceeded $250,000. Bank-
ruptcy Act ch. 575, § 156, 52 Stat. 888 (1938) (former 11 U.S.C. § 556 (1976) (repealed
1978)). Former Fed. Bankr. R. 10-202(a) (1973) also permitted the court to appoint a
trustee in a Chapter X proceeding even where the outstanding indebtedness was less
than $250,000.
In contrast, Chapter XI had no provision for the automatic appointment of a
trustee except that the bankruptcy court could continue the appointment of a trustee.
Bankruptcy Act ch. 575, § 332, 52 Stat. 908 (1938) (former 11 U.S.C. § 732 (1976)
(repealed 1978)). Nevertheless, section 332 of Chapter XI did allow the court to ap-
point a receiver on application, and for cause. See Fed. Bankr. R. 11-18(b) (1973).
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pointment of an independent trustee be discretionary except
in cases where the debtor is a corporation with debts of
$1,000,000 or more and 300 or more security holders. In this
case the appointment of a trustee would be presumptive, ab-
sent a finding by the bankruptcy court that the protection
afforded by a trustee is unnecessary or that the expense in-
curred by the appointment of a trustee would be dispropor-
tionate to the protection afforded.26 Although still
considerably deferential to the views of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC),27 the Commission's proposal
was, nevertheless, a substantial step forward over prior prac-
More importantly, section 328 of Chapter XI (added July 7, 1952, ch. 579, § 30, 66
Stat. 432 (11 U.S.C. § 782 (1976)) and Fed. Bankr. R. 11-15 (1973) permitted the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), or other party in interest, to move to
convert the proceedings to a case under Chapter X of the Act. Thus, the rehabilita-
tion effort was often delayed by prolonged litigation over the issue of whether the
debtor was a proper candidate for Chapter XI. See, e.g., Securities & Exch. Comm'n
v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594 (1965); General Stores Corp. v. Shlen-
sky, 350 U.S. 462 (1956); Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. United States Realty & Im-
provement Co., 310 U.S. 434 (1940); Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Canandaigua
Enter. Corp., 339 F.2d 14, 19 (2d Cir. 1964) (commenting that the Chapter XI and
Chapter X schema produces pointless and wasteful litigation as to which Chapter
should be utilized with the resulting risk that "the patient may die before an operating
room is ready or for which the fees of the surgeon and others in attendance may
exceed the patient's means.").
Finally, Chapter XII left the debtor in possession in nearly ali cases, except where
a trustee was appointed under a prior filing under another chapter or where, for cause
shown, the court appointed a trustee. Bankruptcy Act § 432, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 918 (11
U.S.C. § 832 (1976) (repealed 1978)), and Fed. Bankr. R. 12-17(a) and (b)).
Thus, under the former practice, the issue of whether or not debtor's management
should be replaced by an independent trustee was largely dependent upon the choice
of the rehabilitation chapter, and not necessarily the needs of the case.
26. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 253. The specific Commission recom-
mendation was contained in section 7-102 of the proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973,
which provided, in pertinent part, that:
(a) Determination by Court. On the application of the administrator or any
party in interest, and after hearing on notice, the court may order the adminis-
trator to appoint a trustee. If the debtor is a corporation having debts of
$1,000,000 or more and 300 or more security holders, the administrator shall
apply to the court to determine whether a trustee should be appointed, and the
court shall order such appointment unless it finds that the protection afforded
by a trustee is unnecessary or that the expense would be disproportionate to
the protection afforded.
Id. at 221. The Commission's proposed legislation was introduced in the 93d Cong.
as H.R. 10792, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) and S. 2565, 93 Cong., Ist Sess. (1973). See
supra note 2.
27. See Trost, Corporate Reorganizations Under Chapter VII of the '"ankruptcy
Act of 1973"- Another View, 48 AM. BANKR. L.J. 111, 124-25 (1974) (criticizing the
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tice in that it provided for a more flexible, discretionary ap-
proach to the displacement of current management.28
Shortly after the Commission's proposal was released,
the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges drafted and
submitted an alternative Bankruptcy Act. 29 Although the
Commission's and Bankruptcy Judges' proposals differed in
many respects, the Judges' recommendation with respect to
the appointment of a trustee was almost identical to the
Commission's proposal.30 Not surprisingly, the SEC voiced
strong opposition to many of the changes recommended by
the Commission and the National Conference of Bank-
ruptcy Judges. The SEC particularly opposed the proposed
elimination of the mandatory appointment of disinterested
trustees for public companies. 31 The SEC complained that,
Commission's "curtsy to history and Chapter X" for retaining the presumption of
displacement in the case of "public companies").
28. Although Congress ultimately rejected the presumptive appointment of a
trustee in the so-called "public case," it is clear that portions of the Commission's
proposal were incorporated, particularly the recommendations that "in every case the
court should make a determination as to whether an independent trustee is needed
under the particular facts and circumstances of that case," and that the bankruptcy
court should consider whether the "expense [of a trustee] would be disproportionate
to the protection afforded." CoMMIssION REPORT, supra note 2, at 25.
29. For an excellent comparison of the competing proposals, see Lee, A Critical
Comparison of the Commission Bill and the Judges' Billfor the Amendment of the
BankruptcyAct, 49 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1975). The proposal of the National Confer-
ence of Bankruptcy Judges (the Judges' bill) was introduced as H.R. 16643 and S.
4060 in the 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), and as H.R. 32 and S. 235 in the 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975). See also Hooton, The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion Under Chapter X, Chapter XI and Proposed Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act,
18 B.C.L. REv. 427, 455 (1977); See generally Trost, supra note 10.
30. Section 7-102(a) of both bills provided for the discretionary appointment of a
trustee, except that each bill created a presumption in favor of appointment when a
corporate debtor had $1,000,000 of debts and 300 or more equity security holders.
Both bills also authorized any party in interest to apply for a trustee in nonpublic
debtor cases.
The principal differences between the bills, at least with respect to the issue of the
appointment of a trustee, were more procedural than substantive. For example, while
the Commission's bill provided that the administrator must apply to the bankruptcy
court to determine whether a trustee should be appointed, the Judges' bill permitted
the debtor to attempt to forestall the appointment of a trustee in public cases by filing
an application to dispense with the appointment of a trustee. Lee, supra note 29, at
43-44.
31. See Report of Securities and Exchange Commission on S. 235 and S.236:
Hearings on S. 235 and S. 236 before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. II, 738,
749-54 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 235 and S. 236]. See also id. at 707,
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in large public cases, the investors' interests would not be
adequately protected because the proposed legislation cre-
ated unworkable delays, aggravated the transitional
problems and trauma occasioned by the mere filing of a
bankruptcy petition, and, in general, failed to recognize the
advantages of a disinterested trustee. 2 Accordingly, the
SEC proposed textual changes deleting those sections of the
Commission's and Judges' bills pertaining to the discretion-
ary appointment of a trustee, and inserting instead a provi-
sion modeled after section 156 of Chapter X of the
Bankruptcy Act, which called for the mandatory, immediate
appointment of a trustee.3
Although Congress ultimately rejected the SEC's pro-
posed "mandatory appointment rule" in large public cases,34
it is clear that the SEC's input had an immediate and deci-
sive impact upon the legislative history of section 1104(a).
In the two years which followed, the sharply divergent views
concerning the standards for the appointment of a trustee in
a Chapter 11 proceeding crystallized into two different con-
gressional bills, House bill 820035 and Senate bill 2266.36
709,715 (testimony and statements of then SEC Commissioner Philip A. Loomis, Jr.);
HEARINGS ON H.R. 31 AND H.R. 32, supra note 17, at 2164-2210 (especially 2175-80)
(Report of Securities and Exchange Commission on Proposed Bankruptcy Legislation
(H.R. 31 and H.R. 32)); id. at 2152-54 (statement of then SEC Commissioner Philip
A. Loomis, Jr.).
32. HEARINGS ON H.R. 31 AND H.R. 32, supra note 17, at 2177-79 (Report of
Securities and Exchange Commission on Proposed Bankruptcy Legislation (H.R. 31
and H.R. 32)).
33. See id. at 2162 (statement of then SEC Commissioner Philip A. Loomis, Jr.).
34. See supra note 18.
35. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). H.R. 8200 was the product of many
compromises, evolving from H.R. 6, which was introduced by Representatives Don
Edwards and M. Caldwell Butler on January 4, 1977. H.R. 6, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977); H.R. 6 represented a merger of the Commission's and Judges' bills, together
with the input of numerous other interested organizations and individuals, most nota-
bly the National Bankruptcy Conference. See Klee, supra note 1, at 280. H.R. 6 was
replaced by H.R. 7330 on May 23, 1977, following extensive revisions and amend-
ments during markup. H.R. 7330, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Klee, supra note 1, at
281. After additional markup, H.R. 7330 was superseded by H.R. 8200, which was
reported on July 11, 1977, with strong support by the House Judiciary Committee.
Following additional discussion and circulation, H.R. 8200 passed the House by voice
vote on February 1, 1978. 124 Cong. Rec. 1783 (1978); Klee, supra note 1, at 282, 287.
36. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). S. 2266 was "essentially the analogue of
H.R. 8200, although there were substantial differences between the two bills." Klee,
supra note 1, at 285. S. 2266 was introduced in the Senate on October 31, 1977, by
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House bill 8200 largely mirrored the Commission's and
Bankruptcy Judges' proposals by requiring the bankruptcy
court to determine on a case-by-case basis, whether the ap-
pointment of a trustee is necessary taking into account
whether the costs and expenses outweigh the benefits pro-
vided to the estate.37 Senate Bill 2266, on the other hand,
altered the Commission's and Bankruptcy Judges' proposals
and acquiesced, at least in part, in the SEC's proposal by
mandating the appointment of a trustee 38 in any case involv-ing a so-called "public company, ' 39 but otherwise permitting
the discretionary appointment of a trustee in "nonpublic"
cases.40  Not surprisingly, the SEC strongly endorsed the
Senate's version of section 1104(a), testifying that the Sen-
ate's alternative would overcome the weaknesses of both
Senators Dennis DeConcini and Malcolm Wallop. After markup and amendments,
S. 2266 was reported to the Senate with approval by the Senate Judiciary Committee
on July 14, 1978. Id. at 287. See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 18. Following
additional discussions, circulation and amendments, S. 2266 passed the Senate by
voice vote on September 7, 1978. 124 Cong. Rec. 28,282 (1978) (as observed supra
note 15, the Senate technically passed H.R. 8200, as revised by the Senate amendment
in the nature of a substitute); Klee, supra note 1, at 288-89.
37. Section 1104(a) of H.R. 8200 provided that:
At any time after the commencement of the case but before the confirma-
tion of a plan, on request of a party in interest or the United States trustee, and
after notice and a hearing, the court may order the appointment of a trustee
only if-
(1) the protection afforded by a trustee is needed; and
(2) the costs and expenses of a trustee would not be disproportionately
higher than the value of the protection afforded.
38. Section 1104(a) of S. 2266 provided in pertinent part, that: "In the case of a
public company, the court, within ten days after entry of an order for relief under this
chapter, shall appoint a disinterested trustee."
39. S. 2266, § 1101(3). See also supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
40. Section 1104(b) of S. 2266 essentially followed the House formulation of sec-
tion 1104(a). For convenience in comparing H.R. 8200 and S. 2266, the provisions in
H.R. 8200 deleted from S. 2266 are enclosed in brackets, and the new material in S.
2266 is printed in italic.
In the case of the nonpublic company, at any time after the commencement
of the case but before the confirmation of a plan, on request of a party in
interest [or the United States trustee,] and after notice and a hearing the court
for cause shown may order the election or if the creditors do not elect a trustee
the court may appoint a trustee. The court shall order the election or (f the credi-
tors do not elect appointment of a trustee [only] if-
(1) the protection afforded by a trustee is needed; and
(2) the costs and expenses of a trustee would not be disproportionately
greater than the value of the protection afforded.
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House Bill 8200 and the related proposals of the Commis-
sion and the Bankruptcy Judges.4 I
Notwithstanding the sharply critical views of the SEC,
however, the final congressional product largely reflects the
House view on the appointment of trustees.42 With the ex-
ception of the Code provision requiring the appointment of
an examiner where the debtor's liabilities exceed $5,000,000
and a party in interest requests such an appointment,43 there
are no other "remnant[s] of the 'public company' exception
contained in S. 2266." 44 Yet, while section 1104(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code "is derived in large part" from the version
of Chapter 11 contained in the House bill, 4- and "rejects the
41. See HEARINGS ON S. 2266 AND H.R. 8200 BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
IMPROVEMENTS IN JUDICIAL MACHINERY OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDI-
CIARY, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 620, 624-25 (1978) (statement of the SEC) [hereinafter
cited as HEARINGS ON S. 2266 AND H.R. 8200]. The SEC criticized H.R. 8200 for
engendering the same litigational and administrative nightmare as that which existed
under the Act because of transfer motions brought under section 328 of Chapter X
and Fed. Bankr. R. 11-15 of the Act. .1d. at 624. See also supra notes 2 & 25. In the
SEC's view, H.R. 8200 ignored the practical realities of large reorganization proceed-
ings, and effectively sacrificed the needs of public investors. See HEARINGS ON S.
2266 AND H.R. 8200, supra, at 624-25.
42. As much as anything else, Pub. L. 95-598, as enacted, is witness to a concerted
effort by the House and Senate managers of H.R. 8200 and S. 2266 to produce a
compromise. Nevertheless, "[s]ince the Senate view prevailed on the question of the
status of the bankruptcy courts and the House view prevailed on business reorganiza-
tions, it is somewhat tempting to look at this final compromise as a quid pro quo
involving these two aspects of the proposed Code." SECURITES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, THE SECURITES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION'S ROLE IN BANKRUPTCY
REORGANIZATION PROCEEDINGS, A REPORT BY COMMISSIONER BEVIS LONGSTRETH
(November 21, 1983) at 49, EXHIBIT B, GENERAL COUNSEL'S MEMORANDUM [herein-
after cited as LONGSTRETH REPORT and GENERAL COUNSEL'S MEMORANDUM, re-
spectively]. The General Counsel's Memorandum, entitled "The Role of the
Securities and Exchange Commission in Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases," and
dated September, 1983, was prepared by the Office of the General Counsel of the
Securities and Exchange Commission at the request of Commissioner Longstreth in
connection with the Commissioner's broader examination of the presence of the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission in bankruptcy proceedings. The General Coun-
sel's Memorandum is divided into two parts. Part I consists of a legal analysis of the
SEC role in bankruptcy reorganization cases, while Part II largely consists of a statis-
tical analysis of the SEC practice under the new Bankruptcy Code in bankruptcy
court, including a case profile and issue analysis of the success of the SEC.
43. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(b)(2) (1982).
44. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 10, T 1104.02, at 1104-28.
45. 124 Cong. Rec. 32,403 (1978) (floor statement of Representative Don Ed-
wards on the passage of the House amendment to the Senate amendment in the na-
ture of a substitute to H.R. 8200); 124 Cong. Rec. 34,003 (1978) (floor statement of
Senator Dennis DeConcini on the passage of the final Senate amendment in the na-
ture of a substitute to H.R. 8200).
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concept of separate treatment for a public company, ' ' 6
neither the courts47 nor the commentators48 have ignored the
fact that "the two alternative standards of appointment are
derived with modifications from the Senate amendment, in-
stead of the standard stated in the House bill. ' 49 Thus, Part
II of this article examines how the courts have construed sec-
tion 1104(a) in light of its unusual legislative history.
II. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION AND ANALYSIS OF
SECTION 1104(A)
Because both the structure5° and the legislative history5'
of Chapter 11 evidence a clear intent on the part of Congress
to allow the debtor to remain in possession, the courts have
exhibited an understandable reluctance to appoint trustees.
The authorities are in agreement that the moving52 party
46. 124 Cong. Rec. at 32,405, 34,005 (1978).
47. See infra text accompanying notes 59-60.
48. See, e.g., Moller, supra note 10, at 460-6 1; Moller & Foltz, supra note 2, at 910
(arguing that because section 1104(a) embodies the same criteria previously relied
upon by the SEC in its motion practice under section 328 of the Act and Federal
Bankruptcy Rule 11-15, section 1104(a) merely effects a "renaming" of an old
motion).
49. 124 Cong. Rec. at 32,405, 34,005 (1978).
50. The interplay between sections 1106, 1107, 1108, 363(c)(1) and 303(f) makes it
clear that, unless the court orders otherwise, the debtor continues to operate the busi-
ness once a petition, even an involuntary petition, is filed. See generally 11 U.S.C.
§§ 303(f), 363(c)(1), 1106-1108 (1982). Under the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor in
possession has all the rights and powers of a trustee under section 1107(a), and the
reference to "trustee" in section 1108 includes the debtor in possession. See also supra
note 4 and case cited therein.
51. See, e.g., HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 404, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 6360; SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 116, reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5902; see also 124 Cong. Rec. 32,405, 34,005 (1978)
("section 1107 applies to give the debtor in possession all the rights and powers of a
trustee in a case under Chapter 11; this includes the power of the trustee to operate
the debtor's business under section 1108.").
52. As noted above, a trustee is appointed only at the request of a party in interest
and "after notice and a hearing." 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1982). The phrase "after no-
tice and a hearing" is defined in section 102(l)(A) to mean "after such notice as is
appropriate in the particular circumstances, and such opportunity for a hearing as is
appropriate in the particular circumstances. . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 102(1)(A) (1982). In
this regard, BANKR. R.P. 9007 provides that, when notice is to be given, as it must
when a party seeks the appointment of a trustee, the bankruptcy court "shall desig-
nate. . . the time within which, the persons to whom, and the form and manner in
which the notice shall be given."
It appears that the Bankruptcy Code and the newly adopted Bankruptcy Rules
contemplate that a party seeking the appointment of a trustee should do so by filing a
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bears a heavy burden in overcoming the presumption that
the debtor should remain in possession.5 3 The courts fre-
quently note that, although perhaps not a disfavored rem-
edy, a motion for the appointment of a trustee should at least
motion. The necessity of filing a motion to appoint a trustee arises by negative impli-
cation. BANKR. R.P. 7001, which defines those proceedings which are treated as "ad-
versary proceedings" for purposes of the Bankruptcy Rules, does not include the
appointment of a trustee among its list often items which are governed by Part VII of
the Bankruptcy Rules. Accordingly, the inference arises that a party seeking the ap-
pointment of a trustee should treat the matter as a "contested matter" under Rule
9014, and file and serve a motion for the appointment of a trustee (or, in the alterna-
tive, for an examiner) pursuant to Rule 9013. As a practical matter, however, this
may prove to be a difference without anything more than a $60.00 distinction since a
contested motion seeking the appointment of a trustee is likely to put the case in an
extremely adversarial posture, particularly since the moving party will probably wish
to obtain a scheduling order providing for expedited discovery and a hearing on a
fairly short-term basis.
It should also be noted that section 102(l)(B) authorizes the court to act without
an actual hearing if the moving party does provide proper notice and if "such a hear-
ing is not requested timely by a party in interest" or "there is insufficient time for a
hearing to be commenced before such act must be done, and the court authorizes such
act. . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 102(l)(B)(i)-(ii) (1982). Although it is unlikely that any court
would invoke such an extraordinary remedy without an opportunity for the debtor to
be heard, the facts and circumstances of the case may dictate such a result, particu-
larly where the debtor's conduct is so flagrantly fraudulent or dishonest as to mandate
the immediate displacement of current management. See In re Consolidated Equi-
ties, Inc., No. 84-0466 slip. op. (D.P.R. March 6, 1984) (available Jan. 2, 1984, on
LEXIS, Bkrtcy library) ("Hearings on motions for appointment of trustees are not
among the events for which Bankruptcy Rule 2002(a) requires not less than a twenty-
day notice to the debtor.").
53. See, e.g., In re Ford, 36 Bankr. 501, 504 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983); Cent. States
S.E. & S.W. Areas Health & Pension Funds v. Columbia Motor Express, Inc., (In re
Columbia Motor Express, Inc.), 33 Bankr. 389, 393 (M.D. Tenn. 1983); In re Brown,
31 Bankr. 583, 584 (D.D.C. 1983); In re Garland Corp., 6 Bankr. 456, 460 (Bankr. 1st
Cir. 1980); In re Ford, 36 Bankr. 501, 504 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983); In re Allsun
Juices, Inc., 34 Bankr. 162, 163 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983); In re Harlow, 34 Bankr. 668,
670 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983); Ward v. Guglielmo (In re Guglielmo), 30 Bankr. 102,
107 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1983); In re UNR Indus., Inc., 30 Bankr. 609, 612 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1983); In re Deena Packaging Indus., Inc., 29 Bankr. 705, 706-07 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Crescent Beach Inn, Inc., 22 Bankr. 155, 159 (Bankr. D. Me.
1982); In re Anniston Food-Rite, Inc., 20 Bankr. 511, 514 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1982); In
re Tyler, 18 Bankr. 574, 577 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); Official Creditors' Comm. v.
Liberal Mkt., Inc. (In re Liberal Mkt., Inc.), 13 Bankr. 748, 751 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1981); In re Steak Loft of Oakdale, Inc., 10 Bankr. 182, 185 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981);
In re Sea Queen Kontaratos Lines, Ltd., 10 Bankr. 609, 609 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981); In
re L.S. Good & Co., 8 Bankr. 312, 314 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1980); In re McCordi
Corp., 6 Bankr. 172, 176 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Eichorn, 5 Bankr. 755, 757
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1980); In re Lenihan, 4 Bankr. 209, 212 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1980);
Dardarian v. La Sherene, Inc. (In re La Sherene, Inc.), 3 Bankr. 169, 174 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1980).
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be considered an extraordinary remedy, and one which may
impose a substantial financial burden on the already hard-
pressed debtor seeking relief under the Bankruptcy Code.5 4
The evolving case law under section 1104(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code closely reflects both the pattern of analysis sug-
gested by the relevant legislative history of the final
congressional product and the "fresh start" policy which un-
derlies much of the Bankruptcy Code.5 5 The courts have
recognized that some evidence of mismanagement, impru-
dent decision making, and lack of "exemplary business acu-
men'56 is to be expected, and, accordingly, merely
establishing that the debtor exercised poor business planning
will not suffice to overcome the presumption that the debtor
shall remain in possession.57
54. See, e.g., Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Michaels (In re Marin Mo-
tor Oil, Inc.), 689 F.2d 445, 446 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1196 (1983); In
re Ford, 36 Bankr. 501, 504 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983); In re Harlow, 34 Bankr. 668,
670 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983);In re Allsun Juices, Inc., 34 Bankr. 162, 163 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1983); In re Deena Packaging Indus., Inc., 29 Bankr. 705, 706-07 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Anniston Food-Rite, Inc., 20 Bankr. 511, 516 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 1982); In re Bonded Mailings, Inc., 20 Bankr. 781, 785-86 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1982); In re Tyler, 18 Bankr. 574, 577-78 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); In re F.A. Potts &
Co., Inc., 20 Bankr. 3, 4 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); In re Main Line Motors, Inc., 9
Bankr. 782, 784 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); In re L.S. Good & Co., 8 Bankr. 312, 314
(Bankr. N.D.W. Va. 1980); In re McCordi Corp., 6 Bankr. 172, 176 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1980); Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc. (In re Anchorage Boat
Sales, Inc.), 4 Bankr. 635, 644 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980); Hotel Assocs., Inc. v. Trustees
of Cent. States S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund (In re Hotel Assocs., Inc.), 3 Bankr.
343, 345 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980).
55. See, e.g., House REPORT, supra note 2, at 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 6179-80. See also 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 10,
1104.01, at 1104-21 ("The philosophy of Chapter 11 is to give the debtor a 'second
chance'. .. ").
56. In re Sea Queen Kontaratos Lines, Ltd., 10 Bankr. 609, 610 (Bankr. D. Me.
1981) (noting 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 10, 1104.01, at 1104-2).
57. Id. See also In re Deena Packaging Indus., Inc., 29 Bankr. 705, 707 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Table Talk, Inc., 22 Bankr. 706, 712 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982); In
re Crescent Beach Inn, Inc., 22 Bankr. 155, 159 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982); Smith v. Con-
cord Coal Corp. (In re Concord Coal Corp.), I1 Bankr. 552, 553 (Bankr. S.D.W. Va.
1981); In re Eichorn, 5 Bankr. 755, 757 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980); Midlantic Nat'l Bank
v. Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc., (In re Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc.), 4 Bankr. 635, 645
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980); Dardarian v. La Sherene, Inc. (In re La Sherene, Inc.), 3
Bankr. 169, 174 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980). See generaly 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,
supra note 10, 1104.01, at 1104-21.
In a related vein, the courts also properly observe that it is not the function of a
bankruptcy court to second guess the debtor's business judgment unless that business
judgment evidences gross incompetence or dishonesty. See, e.g., In re UNR Indus.,
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Moreover, the courts are quick to draw a distinction be-
tween the kind of analysis dictated by section 1104(a)(1), the
"for cause" standard, and the kind of analysis dictated by
section 1104(a)(2), the "best interests" standard.5 More pre-
cisely, the better reasoned authorities note that, under the
section 1104(a)(1) "for cause" standard, the courts' discre-
tion is necessarily more circumspect because the literal lan-
guage of the statute mandates the appointment of a trustee in
those instances where the evidence satisfies the "for cause"
standard.59  Not surprisingly, therefore, most courts that
Inc., 30 Bankr. 609, 612 (Bankr. N.D. IUI. 1983); In re Frank, 27 Bankr. 748, 750
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983); Allied Technology, Inc. v. R.B. Brunemann & Sons, Inc. (In
re Allied Technology, Inc.), 25 Bankr. 484, 495 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982). See also In
re Curlew Valley Assocs., 14 Bankr. 506, 511 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) ("The courtroom
is not a boardroom."). Significantly, it is not the quality of the debtor in possession's
management that is the subject of review so much as it is the integrity of current
management. As the bankruptcy court properly noted in Smith v. Concord Coal
Corp. (In re Concord Coal Corp.), 11 Bankr. 552, 554 (Bankr. S.D.W. Va. 1981), the
time for evaluating the quality of the debtor in possession's management is at the time
of confirmation pursuant to the dictates of section 1129(a)(5)(A)(i)-(ii).
58. As noted by Bankruptcy Judge Watson in his excellent analysis in In re An-
niston Food-Rite, Inc., 20 Bankr. 511, 514-15 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1982), the fact that
section 1104(a) has two alternative standards was no Congressional accident, although
the "for cause" and "best interests" standards were once conjunctive tests in the
House bill. See HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 402, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 6357. See also infra note 78. Nevertheless, the final legislative enactment
clearly shows that Congress deliberately disjoined the two tests, choosing instead to
create two separate bases for the appointment of a trustee. In re Anniston Food-Rite,
Inc., 20 Bankr. 511, 514-15 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1982). See also In re Garland Corp., 6
Bankr. 456, 460 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1980).
The disjunctive nature of these two tests has caused some degree of consternation
because it is difficult to imagine a situation where a court would find that "cause"
existed to appoint a trustee but that such an appointment was not in the "best inter-
ests" of the creditors and equity security holders. See, e.g.,Anniston Food-Rite, Inc.,
20 Bankr. at 515; 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 10, 1104.01, at 1104-21 to
-23. Conversely, it would be difficult to imagine a situation that satisfied the "best
interests" standard that did not also satisfy the requisites of the "for cause" standard.
Nevertheless, a number of courts have found that evidence which was insufficient to
satisfy the "for cause" standard was sufficient to permit the appointment of trustee
under the "best interests" standard. See generally infra notes 94-103 and accompany-
ing text.
59. See In re Ford, 36 Bankr. 501, 504 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983); In re Brown, 31
Bankr. 583, 584-85 (D.D.C. 1983); In re Deena Packaging Indus., Inc., 29 Bankr. 705,
706 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Anniston Food-Rite, Inc., 20 Bankr. 511, 516
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1982); In re Bonded Mailings, Inc., 20 Bankr. 781, 786 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Hotel Assocs., Inc., 7 Bankr. 130, 133 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980); In
re Eichorn, 5 Bankr. 755, 757 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980); Midlantic Nat'l Bank v.
Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc. (In re Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc.), 4 Bankr. 635, 644-45
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980); Dardarian v. La Sherene, Inc. (In re La Sherene, Inc.), 3
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have carefully examined the "for cause" standard require
the moving party to establish the requisite "cause" by clear
and convincing evidence. °
In contrast, the judicial construction of the section
1104(a)(2) "best interests" standard has emphasized the
courts' "broad equity powers to engage in a cost-benefit
analysis in order to determine whether the appointment of a
trustee would be in the interests of creditors, equity security
holders, and other interests of the estate." 6' Typically, the
courts note that section 1104(a)(2) embodies a more flexible
standard under which the bankruptcy court can more readily
exercise its historically broad equitable powers.62 The courts
have also observed that a moving party should not confuse
its own self interest with the interests of the estate and credi-
Bankr. 169, 174 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980). See also Flushing Sav. Bank v. Parr (In re
Parr), I Bankr. 453, 457 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1979) ("[W]hile rejecting the Senate ver-
sion, which would have made the appointment of a trustee mandatory in the case of a
public company, § 1104(a) as enacted, unlike the House version, does make it
mandatory for the Bankruptcy Court to appoint a trustee if the requirements of subdi-
vision (1). . . are met."). Also note Judge Schwartzberg's careful explication of the
legislative history surrounding the use of the word "shall" in section 1104(a)(1) in In
re McCordi Corp., 6 Bankr. 172, 176-78 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
But see Official Creditors' Comm. v. Liberal Mkt., Inc. (In re Liberal Mkt., Inc.),
13 Bankr. 748, 751 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981), and In re Main Line Motors, Inc., 9
Bankr. 782, 784 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981), in which the bankruptcy courts suggest that
the equitable considerations dictated under the section 1104(a)(2) "best interests"
analysis are also applicable to a determination of whether a trustee should be ap-
pointed "for cause" under section 1 104(a)(l). Compare these with Bankruptcy Judge
Watson's criticism of Main Line Motors in In re Anniston Food-Rite, Inc., 20 Bankr.
511, 516 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1982).
60. See, e.g., In re Tyler, 18 Bankr. 574, 577 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); In re F.A.
Potts & Co., Inc., 20 Bankr. 3, 5 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); Official Creditors' Comm. v.
Liberal Mkt., Inc. (In re Liberal Mkt., Inc.), 13 Bankr. 748, 751 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1981); In re L.S. Good & Co., 8 Bankr. 312, 314 (Bankr. N.D.W. Va. 1980).
61. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc. (In re Anchorage Boat
Sales, Inc.), 4 Bankr. 635, 644 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980); In re L.S. Good & Co., 8
Bankr. 312, 314 (Bankr. N.D.W. Va. 1980).
62. See also In re Brown, 31 Bankr. 583, 585 (D.D.C. 1983); In re Anniston
Food-Rite, Inc., 20 Bankr. 511, 516 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1982); In re Main Line Motors,
Inc., 9 Bankr. 782, 784 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); In re Eichorn, 5 Bankr. 755, 758
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1980); Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc. (In re
Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc.), 4 Bankr. 635, 644 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980); In re L.S.
Good & Co., 8 Bankr. 312, 314 (Bankr. N.D.W. Va. 1980); Hotel Assocs., Inc. v.
Trustees of Cent. States S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund (In re Hotel Assocs., Inc.),
3 Bankr. 343, 345 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980) ("In equity. . . courts eschew rigid abso-
lutes and look to the practical realities and necessities inescapably involved in recon-
ciling competing interests.").
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tors generally, 3 and that, notwithstanding the Congressional
intent to weigh the costs of appointing a trustee against the
concomitant benefits,64 the "cost-benefit" factor must ulti-
mately give way to the "cost-protection" factor, even at the
risk of depleting the estate.65
While it is clear that section 1104(a) empowers the court
to exercise its broad equitable discretion on a case-by-case
basis, it is also clear that Congress carefully delimited the
scope of the bankruptcy court's equitable powers. For ex-
ample, although the Bankruptcy Code provides that the
bankruptcy court may issue any order, process or judgment
necessary to carry out the provisions of the Code,66 the court
is expressly prohibited from appointing a receiver. 67 The ap-
pointment of a trustee is the only statutorily authorized al-
ternative to a debtor in possession in Chapter 11
proceedings. 8 Moreover, because the court itself is not a
"party in interest," it may not, on its own motion, order the
appointment of a trustee under section 1104.69 Thus, the
63. See, e.g.,In re Sea Queen Kontaratos Lines, Ltd., 10 Bankr. 609, 610 (Bankr.
D. Me. 1981).
64. See, e.g., HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 402-03, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. &. AD. NEWS 6357-58.
65. In re Hamiel & Sons, Inc., 20 Bankr. 830, 832 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982).
66. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1982).
67. 11 U.S.C. § 105(b) (Supp. III 1979). One of the purposes of section 105(b) is
to prevent a bankruptcy court from appointing a receiver where no grounds exist for
the appointment of a trustee under section 1104(a). 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,
supra note 10, 1104.01, at 1104-22 n.45. See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at
29, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5815. But cf. In re Record &
Tape Place, Inc., No. 81-1665-L, (Bankr. D. Mass. April 7, 1983) (available Apr. 26,
1984, on LEXIS, Bkrtcy library) (after properly noting that the prior confirmation of
the debtor's plan effectively cut off the court's authority to appoint a trustee, the court
nevertheless appointed a "supervisor" pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1982) to moni-
tor and investigate the postconfirmation operations of the debtor).
68. In re Casco Bay Lines, Inc., 17 Bankr. 946, 952 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982). As the
Casco Bay Lines appellate panel noted, a Chapter 11 reorganization envisions only
two possible alternatives: the debtor in possession or the debtor "out of possession,"
the latter instance of which mandates the appointment of a trustee. Id. at 95 1.
69. The literal language of section 1104(a) restricts the discretion of the court in
that a trustee may only be appointed on request of a party in interest and after notice
and a hearing. The phrase "party in interest" is defined in section 1109(b) in such a
way as to make it clear that the court may not, sua sponte, raise the issue of the need
for the appointment of a trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (1982). See also In re Manda-
lay Shores Co-op. Housing Ass'n, 22 Bankr. 202, 207 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982); In re
Harper Indus., Inc., 18 Bankr. 773, 775 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); In re Alpine Lumber
&Nursery, 13 Bankr. 977, 979 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981); In re Gurwitch, 6 BANKR. CT.
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burden of displacing the debtor in possession falls squarely
upon the moving party.
A. Appointment of a Trustee "'For Cause"
Having outlined the general parameters of the emerging
judicial construction of section 1104(a), the discussion now
turns to a more specific analysis of the two alternative stan-
dards, beginning with the "for cause" standard embodied in
section 1104(a)(1). Pursuant to section 1104(a)(1), and in pi-
lot districts7 ° pursuant to section 151104(a), 7' a party in in-
terest may seek the appointment of a trustee "for cause,"
including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross misman-
DEC. (CRR) 264 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980). See also Franke v. S.M.R.S., Inc. (In re
Burstein-Applebee Co. Inc.), 30 Bankr. 779, 781 & n.5 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983), and
In re Beaucrest Realty Assocs., 4 Bankr. 164, 164-66 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980), for the
related proposition that, because only section 1104 authorizes the appointment of a
trustee in a chapter 11 case, an interim trustee cannot be appointed in an involuntary
chapter 11 case.
70. Although an in-depth analysis of the United States Trustee Pilot Program,
Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 408, 92 Stat. 2686-89, is beyond the scope
of this article, it is important to note that, in pilot districts, the United States Trustee,
as well as any other party in interest, may request the bankruptcy court to order the
appointment of a trustee or examiner. 11 U.S.C. §§ 151104(a)-(b). In fiscal year
1983, United States Trustees filed 503 motions seeking the appointment of trustees or
examiners, and acquiesced to 71 motions filed by other parties. Report of Abt Associ-
ates of Cambridge, Massachusetts (June 1983), at Table 2.5 (hereinafter referred to as
the Abt Report). Significantly, the courts denied only 25 of these motions, and 68
others were withdrawn or denied only after the practices which led to the motion for
the appointment of a trustee or examiner were corrected by the debtors.
If a party in interest requests the appointment, the United States Trustee should
receive notice of the hearing, and the United States Trustee has standing to support or
oppose the appointment. BANKR. R.P. X-1008(a)(5) and X-1009(a). At the present
time, the United States Trustee Pilot Program is in effect in ten groups of judicial
districts: (1) Districts of Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts and Rhode Island;
(2) Southern District of New York; (3) Districts of Delaware and New Jersey; (4)
Eastern District of Virginia and District of District of Columbia; (5) Northern District
of Alabama; (6) Northern District of Texas; (7) Northern District of Illinois; (8) Dis-
tricts of Minnesota, North Dakota and South Dakota; (9) Central District of Califor-
nia; and (10) Districts of Colorado and Kansas. See 11 U.S.C. § 1501 (1982).
The United States Trustee Pilot Program also changes the operation of Chapter I 1
in that, if the court orders the appointment of a trustee, it is the United States Trustee
who makes the actual appointment "after consultation with parties in interest." 11
U.S.C. § 151104(c) (1982). Although the United States Trustee system, as envisioned,
was designed to completely separate the judicial and administrative functions that
were performed by the bankruptcy judges, see HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 109,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6070-71, it is clear that the indi-
vidual chosen by the United States Trustee to serve as the trustee in the case is subject
to court approval. See, e.g., In re Ruffin, Inc., 10 Bankr. 862, 864 (Bankr. D.R.I.
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agement of the affairs of the debtor by current management,
either before or after the commencement of the case.72 The
grounds listed in section 1104(a)(1) are not exclusive,73 and it
is arguable that "cause" also includes at least some of the
1981). Moreover, the trustee or examiner to be appointed in the case must be disinter-
ested, and cannot be the United States Trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 151104(c) (1982).
The United States Pilot Program has proven to be immensely successful. Based
upon a highly favorable evaluation of the program by Abt Associates of Cambridge,
Massachusetts, it is anticipated that the Reagan administration will recommend an
extension of the program through September, 1986, and an increase in its annual
budget for fiscal year 1984 to about $8,200,000. LONGSTRETH REPORT, supra note 42,
at 4. Indeed, although the program was scheduled to "sunset" as of March 30, 1984,
section 408(c) of Pub. L. 95-598 was recently amended by Act of Nov. 28, 1983, Pub.
L. 98-166, 97 Stat. 1081 [hereinafter cited as Pub. L. No. 98-166], to extend the life of
the United States Trustee system to September 30, 1984. Finally, the efficacy of the
United States Trustee program is borne out by the fact that the SEC, obviously
pleased with the performance of the United States Trustees, recently voted unani-
mously to accept the recommendation of the Longstreth Report to eliminate the SEC's
active involvement in pilot districts except where specifically requested to act by the
United States Trustee or the bankruptcy court. LONGSTRETH REPORT, supra note 42,
at 11-13.
Finally, it is extremely significant to note that the recently filed Report of the
Attorney General on the United States Trustee System, required by section 408(b) of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act, also concludes that the United States Trustee program
has been immensely successful. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (OFFICE OF THE AT-
TORNEY GENERAL), REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE UNITED STATES
TRUSTEE SYSTEM, ESTABLISHED IN THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978, FOR
THE PERIOD OCTOBER 1, 1979 TO DECEMBER 31, 1983 (JANUARY 3, 1984) [hereinafter
cited as ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT]. Among other things, theAttorney General'r
Report highlights the role of United States Trustees in Chapter I 1 cases, noting that
"the Trustees have monitored and assisted in the cases that lack active creditor in-
volvement." Id. at 54. The authors of the Attorney General's Report also believe that
"the higher rate of plan confirmation and the lower rate of case inactivity in the pilot
districts reflect, in part, the Trustees' contributions." Id. Based upon these and nu-
merous other findings, the Attorney General's Report also recommends that the United
States Trustee program be implemented on a nationwide basis. Id. at 61-66.
See generally I COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ch. 6 (15th ed. 1982); Galgay & Eck-
stein, Case Administration Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act: The United States
Trustee Program, 1979 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 151.
71. 11 U.S.C. § 151104 (1982).
72. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l) (1982).
73. The rules of construction of the Bankruptcy Code make it clear that the
words "includes" and "including" are not limiting. See 11 U.S.C. § 102(3) (1982).
The courts have rejected any attempts to limit the "for cause" analysis under section
1104(a)(l) to cause "in the nature of fraud, dishonesty, incompetence or gross mis-
management." See, e.g., In re Casco Bay Lines, Inc., 17 Bankr. 946, 950 n.4 (Bankr.
1st Cir. 1982). See also In re Ford, 36 Bankr. 501, 504 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983); In re
Martin, 26 Bankr. 39, 40 (Bankr. S.D.W. Va. 1982).
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grounds for conversion listed in section 1112(b) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.74
The authorities are in agreement that the time frame for
the court's review of current management's actions embraces
conduct both before and after the commencement of the
case.75 The courts have emphasized that neither prepetition
repentance nor a postpetition change of heart of the debtor
in possession will obviate the need for the appointment of a
trustee,76 and that "self-serving testimony as to how past and
current management intends to improve management and
operational actions is mere speculation and not relevant to
the issues of whether past management actions require the
appointment of a trustee under § 1104(a)."77
74. The only other provision of the Bankruptcy Code which employs the phrase
"for cause" is section 1112(b), the provision governing conversion or dismissal of a
case commenced under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 1112(b) lists
nine examples of "cause" for conversion, all but the last four of which provide an
arguable basis for seeking the appointment of a trustee. See, for example, In re Horn
& Hardart Baking Co., 22 Bankr. 668, 671 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982), where the bank-
ruptcy court appointed a trustee after the debtor in possession experienced continuing
and unexplained losses since the filing of the petition. The last four grounds couldnot
serve as the basis for the appointment of a trustee since section 1104(a), by its literal
terms, precludes the court from appointing or considering the appointment of a
trustee after the confirmation of a plan. See generally Note, The Misbehaving Debtor,
supra note 10, at 478, 488 n.54.
75. See, e.g., In re Anniston Food-Rite, Inc., 20 Bankr. 511, 515 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 1982); In re Curlew Valley Assocs., 14 Bankr. 506, 515 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981);
Dardarian v. La Sherene, Inc. (In re La Sherene, Inc.), 3 Bankr. 169, 175 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1980); see also In re Main Line Motors, Inc., 9 Bankr. 782, 784-85 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1981) ("The fact that the events preceded the bankruptcy petition is not
controlling because section 1104(a)(1) embraces activities 'either before or after the
commencement of the case.' ").
One leading textwriter has suggested that section 1104(a)(1) "does not permit the
court to order the appointment of a trustee solely on the grounds that current man-
agement has mismanaged the debtor's affairs." 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra
note 10, 11104.01, at 1104-21 (emphasis added). In the opinion of these authors, this
is an incorrect interpretation of the statute. Section 1104(a)(1) clearly states that the
court shall appoint a trustee for cause, "either before or after the commencement of
the case." (emphasis added). See also In re Anniston Food-Rite, Inc., 20 Bankr. 511,
515 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1982).
76. See, e.g., In re Curlew Valley Assocs., 14 Bankr. 506, 515 (Bankr. D. Utah
1981).
77. Dardarian v. La Sherene, Inc. (In re La Sherene, Inc.), 3 Bankr. 169, 175
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980). Accord In re Covenant Living Centers, Inc., No. 81-02663
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. Nov. 12, 198 1) (unpublished opinion). Bankruptcy Judge Norton's
succinct analysis of section 1104(a)(1) in La Sherene may provide the basis for a mo-
tion in limine by the moving party. Arguably, it would be prudent litigation strategy
to move to limit or otherwise strike any proffered testimony concerning "future plans,
revealed by current management." La Sherene, 3 Bankr. at 175.
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The particular kinds of conduct that have been found to
satisfy the "for cause" standard are not easily susceptible of
classification. Nevertheless, there are a number of cases
where the courts have appointed trustees based upon an ade-
quate showing of: irreconcilable conflicts of interest;7 8 com-
78. See, e.g., In re L.S. Good & Co., 8 Bankr. 312, 315 (Bankr. N.D.W. Va. 1980)
("The magnitude of the number of inter-company transactions places current man-
agement. . . in a position of having grave potential conflicts of interest and the pre-
sumption arises that the current management . . . will be unable to make the
impartial investigations and decisions demanded in evaluating and pursuing inter-
company claims. ... ). See also Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Meckstroth (In re Meck-
stroth), 24 Bankr. 401, 402 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (wrongful diversion of funds); In
re Anniston Food-Rite, Inc., 20 Bankr. 511, 515-16 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1982) (pay-
ments made by debtor corporation for merchandise and other trade debt of related
corporation demonstrated incompetence and mismanagement); In re G.W.F. Inv.
Ltd., No. 3-81-00699 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio March 17, 1982) (competing interests of gen-
eral partners caused intrapartnership feud justifying appointment of trustee); In re
Fisher Holding Co., Inc., 12 Bankr. 195, 199 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1981) (court appointed
trustee in view of inter-company claims and possibility of claims against principals
and insiders individually); In re Main Line Motors, Inc., 9 Bankr. 782, 784-85
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981) (evidence showing that president and sole shareholder of
debtor withdrew funds from debtor's operation and diverted these funds to two other
corporations controlled by this individual demonstrated incompetence and gross mis-
management); Dardarian v. La Sherene, Inc. (In re La Sherene, Inc.), 3 Bankr. 169,
176 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (commingling of the affairs of the debtor in possession
and a related corporation). But see In re Allsun Juices, Inc., 34 Bankr. 162, 163-64
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983) (insufficient evidence to justify appointment); In re Hamiel
& Sons, Inc., 20 Bankr. 830, 831-33 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (despite allegations of
mismanagement and potential liability of officers and directors under "alter ego" doc-
trine, court appointed an examiner instead of a trustee because of the costs of a
trustee); In re Tyler, 18 Bankr. 574, 576-77 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (no trustee ap-
pointed where inter-company advances did not harm creditors of any of the compa-
nies involved).
It should be noted that the mere fact that a debtor corporation engages in business
with its subsidiaries or with related corporations does not de jure establish a conflict
of interest justifying the appointment of a trustee. See In re F.A. Potts & Co., Inc., 20
Bankr. 3, 4 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
79. The "commingling" cases are obviously analytically akin to those cases cited
in supra note 77, where the courts found that certain conflicts of interest justified the
appointment of a trustee. A representative sampling of commingling cases includes In
re Brown, 31 Bankr. 583, 585 (D.D.C. 1983) (commingling of affairs of the corpora-
tion and individuals, exemplified by use of corporate funds to finance individuals'
litigation); In re Philadelphia Athletic Club, Inc., 20 Bankr. 328, 334 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(siphoning of funds from the debtor corporation for personal use by the owner); In re
Casco Bay Lines, Inc., 17 Bankr. 946, 949 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982) (appropriation and
wrongful use of corporate assets for individual benefit); In re Ford, 36 Bankr. 501,
504-05 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983) (postpetition sale and commingling of estate assets
without court approval); In re Vischschoonmaker, Ossendryver Galleries Int'l, Inc.,
35 Bankr. 816, 820 (Bankr. D. Hawaii 1983) (substantial intermingling without ade-
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mingling of assets;79  inadequate accounting records or
controls;80 failure to pay taxes,8 especially employee with-
quate documentation); American Metal Corp. v. Cowley (In re Cowley), No. 82-
20972 (Bankr. D. Kan. Dec. 1, 1983) (available Apr. 26, 1984, on LEXIS, Bkrtcy
library) (personal use of mobile home); In re Great N.E. Lumber & Millwork Corp.,
20 Bankr. 610, 611 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (trustee appointed where new operator of
business was the mere alter ego of the debtor, who may have defrauded creditors); In
re Covenant Living Centers, Inc., No. 81-02663 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Nov. 12, 1981)
(unpublished decision) (diversion of funds to a related corporation notwithstanding
management's belief that the debtor corporation was undercapitalized); In re Phila-
delphia Athletic Club, Inc., 15 Bankr. 60, 61-62 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981) (commingling
of debtor's assets with assets of its acquiring corporation); Dardarian v. La Sherene,
Inc. (In re La Sherene, Inc.), 3 Bankr. 169, 173-75 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (excessive
compensation and "loans" to management, and other grossly incompetent acts such
as corporate payments for the personal use of a penthouse, automobile and boat); In
re Eastern Consol. Utils., Inc., 3 Bankr. 591, 592 n.3 (Bankr. E. D. Pa. 1980) (officers
of the debtor corporation accepted unauthorized payments from the debtor after the
filing of the petition). But ef. In re Tyler, 18 Bankr. 574, 577-78 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1982) (mere proof of preference to debtor in possession's principal shareholder is not
enough to mandate appointment of trustee); Official Creditors' Comm. v. Liberal
Mkt., Inc. (In re Liberal Mkt., Inc.), 13 Bankr. 748, 750-51 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981)
(notwithstanding diversion of funds showing callous disregard of officers' fiduciary
duties, no trustee appointed in part because of "exorbitant expenses engendered by
the appointment of a trustee").
80. See, e.g., In re Brown, 31 Bankr. 583, 585 (D.D.C. 1983) (lack of adequate
accounting controls of a cash business); In re Anniston Food-Rite, Inc., 20 Bankr.
511, 516 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1982) (basic failure to grasp the elements of financial
controls); In re Philadelphia Athletic Club, Inc., 15 Bankr. 60, 64 & n.3 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1981) (assets of debtor corporation commingled with parent and no separate
books, records or tax returns prepared); Dardarian v. La Sherene, Inc. (In re La Sher-
ene, Inc.), 3 Bankr. 169, 174 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (basic failure to exercise financial
control). See also Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc. (In re
Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc.), 4 Bankr. 635, 645 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980) (failure to
adequately supervise bookkeeper, which contributed to sales out of trust, misapplica-
tion of proceeds, and confusion in debtor's accounting system); Hotel Assocs., Inc. v.
Trustees of Cent. States S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund (In re Hotel Assocs., Inc.), 3
Bankr. 343, 345 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980) (failure to keep adequate books and records,
or to properly maintain hotel). But cf. In re F.A. Potts & Co., Inc., 20 Bankr. 3, 6-7
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981) (insufficient evidence to justify appointment of trustee).
The failure to maintain adequate accounting controls is also indirectly evidenced
in cases where the debtor failed to maintain adequate inventory-type controls. See,
e.g., American Metal Corp. v. Cowley (In re Cowley), No. 82-20972 (Bankr. D. Kan.
Dec. 1, 1983) (after-hours theft of property); In re Caroline Desert Disco Inc., 5
Bankr. 536, 537 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1980) (insufficiency of maintenance and security at
the debtor's premises).
Similarly, the bankruptcy courts have shown no tolerance for the mismanaging
debtor in possession who fails to obtain proper insurance, either for its employees or
for its property and goods. See, e.g., In re Brown, 31 Bankr. 583, 585 (D.D.C. 1983)
(failure to obtain proper insurance for both employees and property); Caroline Desert
Disco, Inc., 5 Bankr. at 537 (failure to maintain necessary casualty, public liability
and worker's compensation insurance).
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holding taxes;82 dishonesty;83 and fraud.8 4 The courts have
also ordered the appointment of a trustee where the debtor
in possession has consistently violated the applicable local
rules,85 and where the debtor in possession has either failed
81. See, e.g., In re Brown, 31 Bankr. 583, 585 (D.D.C. 1983) (repeated failure to
timely pay real estate taxes, resulting in additional penalties); Ristagno v. Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania (In re Ristagno), 27 Bankr. 104, 105 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983)
(repeated failure to pay sales taxes); In re Great N.E. Lumber & Millwork Corp., 20
Bankr. 610, 611 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (failure to file and pay sales tax).
82. See, e.g., In re Brown, 31 Bankr. 583, 585 (D.D.C. 1983) (failure to withhold
taxes from employees' wages); In re Covenant Living Centers, Inc., No. 81-02663
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. Nov. 12, 1981) (unpublished opinion) (failure to withhold taxes
from employees' wages); Dardarian v. La Sherene, Inc. (In re La Sherene, Inc.), 3
Bankr. 169, 173 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (debtor withheld $20,000 from employees'
wages but failed to remit the funds to the federal government).
83. See, e.g., In re Deena Packaging Indus., Inc., 29 Bankr. 705, 707-08 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1983) (failure to disclose relevant financial data in schedules); In re Cove-
nant Living Centers, Inc., No. 81-02663 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Nov. 12, 1981) (unpub-
lished opinion) (lack of full disclosure of intercompany transactions); Dardarian v. La
Sherene, Inc. (In re La Sherene, Inc.), 3 Bankr. 169, 175-76 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980)
(general dishonesty exemplified by desperate acts in desperate situations).
84. See. e.g., In re Bonded Mailings, Inc., 20 Bankr. 781, 784 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1982) (fraudulent conduct designed to frustrate secured party's effort to enforce judg-
ment by shifting assets between corporate debtors resulting in hopeless confusion of
records); Hassett v. McColley (In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc.), 16 Bankr. 932, 935
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (fraudulently inducing lending institutions to purchase notes
secured by fictitious and falsified leases and related financing documents); In re Mc-
Cordi Corp., 6 Bankr. 172, 175-76 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) (kiting checks and ob-
taining unentitled overdraft advances); Dardarian v. La Sherene, Inc. (In re La
Sherene, Inc.), 3 Bankr. 169, 173 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (obtaining overdraft ad-
vances when not entitled). But cf. In re Anniston Food-Rite, Inc., 20 Bankr. 511, 515
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1982) (individual debtor's actual fraud in purchasing stocks and in
rendering substantially false financial statements not enough, standing alone, to war-
rant appointment of trustee, but is a factor to be considered); In re McCordi Corp., 6
Bankr. 172, 174 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) (inaccurate income projections do not
amount to fraud merely because they were unduly optimistic).
85. See, e.g., In re Gaff, Inc., No. 3-83-254 (Bankr. D. Minn. March 6, 1984)
(debtor consistently failed to comply with Code's reporting provisions); In re Ford, 36
Bankr. 501, 503-04 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983) (failure to file accurate financial state-
ments, thereby covering up postpetition transfers of assets); In re Vischschoonmaker,
Ossendryver Galleries Int'l, Inc., 35 Bankr. 816, 820 (Bankr. D. Hawaii 1983) (failure
to provide accounting to court); Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Prime, Inc., (In re
Prime, Inc.), 26 Bankr. 556, 560 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983) (in view of debtor's repeated
failure to observe letter and spirit of court's orders, trustee appointed to supervise
debtor, and to file reports required by local rules); In re Horn & Hardart Baking Co.,
22 Bankr. 668, 670-71 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (sporadic filing of monthly statements
combined with continuing, unexplained losses amounted to mismanagement); In re
Caroline Desert Disco, Inc., 5 Bankr. 536, 537 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1980) (debtor's fail-
ure to comply with local rules governing controls of disbursements, reports concern-
ing operation of business, insurance and reports to United States Trustee constituted
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to make payments to a secured party86 or has made unau-
thorized payments87 including, for example, payments on ac-
count of prepetition indebtedness. 8
Significantly, the courts have also recognized the impor-
tance of current management's ability to garner the confi-
dence of major secured parties, unsecured creditors, and
prospective buyers, and have shown little hesitancy to ap-
point a trustee in those instances in which the debtor in pos-
session lacked credibility or failed to instill confidence, 9 or
where, by analogy, the debtor in possession displayed an in-
ability to effectuate a plan of reorganization.9" Finally, the
incompetence or gross mismanagement). See generally In re Modem Office Supply,
Inc., 28 Bankr. 943, 944 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983) (discussing the reporting duties of a
debtor in possession); In re Sea Queen Kontaratos Lines, Ltd., 10 Bankr. 609, 610
(Bankr. D. Me. 1981) (suggesting, in dictum, that a local rule violation is per se gross
mismanagement). But c. In re Crescent Beach Inn, Inc., 22 Bankr. 155, 160 (Bankr.
D. Me. 1982) (despite evidence of Local Rule 2007(b)(2) violation, no appointment;
contrary to Sea Queen Kontaratos Lines, court expressly declines to adopt a per se
rule).
86. See, e.g., In re McCall, 34 Bankr. 68, 69 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983) (debtor's
failure to make any monthly payments to mortgagees over a two-year period consti-
tuted gross mismanagement or incompetence); In re JP Enter., Inc., 22 Bankr. 661,
662 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (debtor's failure to make any rental payments to landlord
over a long period of time constituted gross mismanagement).
87. See, e.g., In re Ford, 36 Bankr. 501, 504 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983) (failure to
obtain court approval for postpetition transfer of assets); In re Bonded Mailings, Inc.,
20 Bankr. 781, 784 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (debtors had been creating and repaying
alleged loans without the benefit of court authorization or sufficient documentation).
88. See, e.g. ,In re Eastern Consol. Utils., Inc., 3 Bankr. 591, 592 n.3 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1980) (debtor had paid money on account of prepetition debts after the filing of
the petition).
89. See, e.g., In re Brown, 31 Bankr. 583, 585 (D.D.C. 1983) (debtor's litigious
personality dissuaded interested parties from closing on sale or lease of debtor's prop-
erty); In re Bonded Mailings, Inc., 20 Bankr. 781, 786 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (trustee
necessary to mediate with intransigent secured party, propose a plan that could be
confirmed over secured party's objection, or report that no rehabilitation is possible);
Smith v. Concord Coal Corp. (In re Concord Coal Corp.), 11 Bankr. 552, 555 (Bankr.
S.D.W. Va. 1981) (highly unlikely that debtor could gain and maintain confidence of
secured lenders); Dardarian v. La Sherene, Inc. (In re La Sherene, Inc.), 3 Bankr. 169,
176 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (debtor lacked managerial and operational credibility,
which threatened relationships with essential suppliers). Cf. Ristagno v. Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania (In re Ristagno), 27 Bankr. 104, 106 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983)
(largest unsecured creditor testified that he would not extend credit to anyone but
debtor; court did not consider testimony to be convincing under a section 1104(a)(1)
analysis).
90. See, e.g., In re McCall, 34 Bankr. 68, 70 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983) (trustee nec-
essary to manage and sell property); In re Brown, 31 Bankr. 583, 583-84 (D.D.C.
1983) (chronic failure to develop property); In re Horn & Hardart Baking Co., 22
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courts have appointed a trustee to investigate and report to
the court on the issue of whether the case should be con-
verted,9' and in those instances where the debtor was either
thrown out of possession92 or where an individual Chapter
11 debtor died.93
B. Appointment of a Trustee Under the "Best
Interests" Standard
The authors of the leading bankruptcy treatise, Collier on
Bankruptcy, have astutely observed that "there are few situ-
ations which come to mind where grounds will exist for the
appointment of a trustee under subsection (a)(2) where
'cause' for such appointment will not [also] exist under sub-
section (a)(1). ' ' 94 Nevertheless, there are a number of in-
stances in which the courts have appointed a trustee under
the "best interests" standard. Not surprisingly, however, the
case law tends to support Collier's analysis. It is not uncom-
mon to find decisions appointing a trustee resting upon both
the "for cause" and the "best interests" standards.
The particular kinds of conduct that have been found to
have satisfied the "best interests" standard are equally im-
mune to simple categorization, particularly since the "best
interests" standard necessarily requires the court to carefully
weigh competing equities.95 Nevertheless, the courts have
appointed trustees where the debtor in possession main-
Bankr. 668, 671 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (continuing losses coupled with failure to sell
lease); In re L.S. Good & Co., 8 Bankr. 312, 315 (Bankr. N.D.W. Va. 1980) (inability
to effectuate a plan). Contra Official Creditors' Comm. v. Liberal Mkt., Inc. (In re
Liberal Mkt., Inc.), 13 Bankr. 748, 750 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981) (appointment of
trustee should not be treated as an early and presumptuous delivery of assets to
creditors).
91. For examples of cases in which a trustee appointed to investigate debtor's
financial history and report to the court on the issue of whether the case should be
converted to Chapter 7 see In re Steak Loft of Oakdale, Inc., 10 Bankr. 182, 186
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) and In re Hotel Assocs., Inc., 7 Bankr. 130, 132 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1980).
92. See, e.g., In re Casco Bay Lines, Inc., 17 Bankr. 946, 951-52 (Bankr. 1st Cir.
1982).
93. In support of the proposition that the death of an individual debtor in a non-
joint Chapter I 1 case is sufficient cause for the appointment of a trustee, see In re
Martin, 26 Bankr. 39, 40 (Bankr. S.D.W. Va. 1982); In re Smith, 6 Bankr. 641, 642
(Bankr. N.D Ga. 1980).
94. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 10, T 1104.01, at 1104-22 to -23.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 61-65.
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tained inadequate books and records, 96 was involved in
grave conflicts of interest,97 or was guilty of commingling as-
sets of the corporation. 98 The courts have also appointed a
trustee under the "best interests" standard to investigate
whether reorganization is possible, 99 and, if so, to propose a
plan of reorganization. °0 Finally, like the cases under the
"for cause" standard, the courts have appointed a trustee
where the debtor in possession failed to maintain the confi-
dence of the secured parties,' 0 ' and in some more unusual
96. See, e.g., In re Philadelphia Athletic Club, Inc., 15 Bankr. 60, 63 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1981) (appointment of trustee in best interests of creditors, equity security holders,
and all others in view of debtor's failure to maintain adequate books and records); see
also Hotel Assocs., Inc. v. Trustees of Cent. States S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund
(In re Hotel Assocs., Inc), 3 Bankr. 343, 345 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980). But Vf. In re
Allsun Juices, Inc., 34 Bankr. 162, 163 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983) (insufficient evidence
of debtor's failure to maintain adequate records).
97. See, e.g.,In re Great N.E. Lumber & Millwork Corp., 20 Bankr. 610, 611-12
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (best interests of creditors to have trustee appointed to investi-
gate debtor's relationship to affiliated entities); In re Philadelphia Athletic Club, Inc.,
15 Bankr. 60, 63 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981) (trustee appointed to investigate admittedly
adverse interests between operator of the debtor and the debtor's equity security hold-
ers); Smith v. Concord Coal Corp. (In re Concord Coal Corp.), 11 Bankr. 552, 554
(Bankr. S.D.W. Va. 1981) (substantial doubt as to whether current management was
loyal to the goal of rehabilitation in view of current management's competing busi-
ness interests and the potential for intercompany dealing); In re L.S. Good & Co., 8
Bankr. 312, 315 (Bankr. N.D.W. Va. 1980) (trustee necessary to investigate and evalu-
ate grave potential conflicts of interest); Dardarian v. La Sherene, Inc. (In re La Sher-
ene, Inc.), 3 Bankr. 169, 176 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (internal officer disputes and
management conflicts made it necessary to appoint trustee under section 1104(a)(2)).
98. See, e.g., In re Ford, 36 Bankr. 501, 504-05 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983); In re
Philadelphia Athletic Club, Inc. , 15 Bankr. 60, 63 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
99. See, e.g., Hotel Assocs., Inc. v. Trustees of Cent. States S.E. & S.W. Areas
Pension Fund (In re Hotel Assocs., Inc.), 3 Bankr. 343. 346 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980).
100. See, e.g., In re L.S. Good & Co., 8 Bankr. 312, 315 (Bankr. N.D.W. Va.
1980) (appointment of trustee in "best interests" of parties because trustee's sole moti-
vation will be to realize the maximum amount of monies possible); In re Vincent, 4
Bankr. 23, 25 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980) (where a trustee had been appointed, the
debtor lost the exclusive right to file a plan in a Chapter 11 proceeding); Hotel As-
socs., Inc. v. Trustees of Cent. States S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund (In re Hotel
Assocs., Inc.), 3 Bankr. 343, 345 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980) ("There is need for the propo-
sal of a plan by a person other than the debtor and such a need is a justification for
the appointment of a trustee under § 1104(a)(2)."). See generally King, supra note
10, at 115-16.
101. See, e.g., Smith v. Concord Coal Corp. (In re Concord Coal Corp.), 11
Bankr. 552, 554 (Bankr. S.D.W. Va. 1981); Dardarian v. La Sherene, Inc. (In re La
Sherene, Inc.), 3 Bankr. 169, 176 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980). AccordIn re 4X Corp., No.
82-04419 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. March 1, 1984). But cf. Ristagno v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania (In re Ristagno), 27 Bankr. 104, 106 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983) (testimony
that major unsecured creditor may refuse to deal with anyone but the debtor may
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situations, such as where the debtor was confined in
prison, 0 2 or where the individual Chapter 11 debtor died
following the filing of the petition. 0 3
In analyzing the "best interests" standard, the courts
have exhibited a natural reluctance to invoke their discretion
to appoint a trustee in marginal cases. 1' 4 For example, the
courts have declined to appoint a trustee where current man-
agement has a needed expertise in a complex industry, 0 5 or
where it was unclear whether a trustee was any more likely
to successfully rehabilitate the debtor than the debtor in pos-
session. 06 Similarly, at least one court has declined to ap-
point a trustee where the sole purpose of the motion was to
deprive the debtor in possession of its right to the 120 day
exclusive period to file a plan. 0 7 Finally, the courts have
sometimes declined to appoint a trustee under the "best in-
terests" standard where the intermediate option of ap-
pointing an examiner under section 1104(b) proved to be a
more palatable option. 0 8 However, it is safe to conclude
carry weight in section 1104(a)(2) analysis); In re Crescent Beach Inn, Inc., 22 Bankr.
155, 160 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982) (largest secured creditors willing to work with current
management).
102. See, e.g., In re New Haven Radio, Inc., 23 Bankr. 762, 767 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(debtor's confinement in prison required appointment of trustee in "best interests" of
creditors, and to preserve radio station's license).
103. See In re Smith, 6 Bankr. 641, 643 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
104. In this regard, the bankruptcy courts have frequently noted that the appoint-
ment of a trustee may even preclude any successful reorganization because of the
attendant expenses of the professional persons the trustee retains. See, e.g., In re
Crescent Beach Inn, Inc., 22 Bankr. 155, 160 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982); In re Liberal
Mkt., Inc., 11 Bankr. 742, 744 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981); In re Eichorn, 5 Bankr. 755,
758 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980); Midlantic Nat'l Bank. v. Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc. (In
re Anchorage Boats Sales, Inc.), 4 Bankr. 635, 644 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980). See gen-
erally 11 U.S.C. §§ 326, 327, 330, 503(b), 507(a)(1), 1129(a)(9)(A) (1982).
105. See, e.g.,In re F.A. Potts & Co., Inc., 20 Bankr. 3, 7 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981)
(coal brokerage business).
106. See, e.g., In re Tyler, 18 Bankr. 574, 578 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
107. See In re Allsun Juices, Inc., 34 Bankr. 162, 164 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983).
108. See, e.g., In re Hamiel & Sons, Inc., 20 Bankr. 830, 832-33 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1982) (in view of the costs of trustee and the fact that estate was not being
depleted, the court would employ "intermediate procedure" of appointing an exam-
iner to investigate the potential liabilities of principal officers and shareholders under
alter ego doctrine); In re Burnside, Lee & Harris Diamond Co., 17 Bankr. 104, 106-07
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981) (in view of the limited operation of debtor's business, only
necessary to appoint examiner); In re Liberal Mkt., Inc., 11 Bankr. 742, 744-45
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981) (absent evidence of "cause" under section 1104(a)(1), "best
interests" of all parties better served by appointing an examiner and vesting the exam-
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that even the appointment of an examiner is an extraordi-
nary remedy. 0 9
III. THE ADVANTAGES OF A CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE
It is axiomatic that the appointment of a trustee has sig-
nificant consequences,' 10 and that the decisions made by the
trustee will have a critical impact on the outcome of the
case."' In a very real sense, the mere displacement of a
fraudulent, dishonest, incompetent, or grossly mismanaging
debtor in possession is the greatest advantage flowing from
the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee. 12
In the opinion of these authors, although there are indis-
putably certain drawbacks in seeking the appointment of a
trustee, 113 where warranted, the advantages far outweigh the
iner with certain additional powers and duties); In re American Bulk Transport Co., 8
Bankr. 337, 340-41 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980) (trustee would not be needed, although it
would be in "best interests" of creditors to appoint an examiner); In re 1243 20th St.,
Inc., 6 Bankr. 683, 685-86 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1980) (appointment of examiner will entail
less administrative expense and disruption of debtor's business). See generally HousE
REPORT, supra note 2, at 402-03, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
6358 ("Generally, a trustee would not be needed in any case where the protection
afforded by a trustee could equally be afforded by an examiner.").
109. See In re Table Talk, Inc., 22 Bankr. 706, 710-13 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982)
(the appointment of an examiner is a discretionary remedy requiring convincing evi-
dence and justifiable expenses); In re 1243 20th St., Inc., 6 Bankr. 683, 686 (Bankr.
D.D.C. 1980) (applications for the appointment of an examiner should not be rou-
tinely granted, but "should be limited to cases in which there is sufficient evidence to
provide a factual basis for the granting of such relief'); In re Lenihan, 4 Bankr. 209,
212 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1980) (mere allegations of fraud are insufficient to mandate the
appointment of an examiner, excellent discussion of the legislative history surround-
ing section 1104(b)); In re Bel Air Assocs., Ltd., 4 Bankr. 168, 173 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1980) (mere allegation of fraud is insufficient to mandate appointment of an
examiner).
110. For example, the appointment of a trustee terminates the debtor's 120 day
exclusive period to file a plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (1982). Similarly, the appointment
of a trustee deprives the debtor of any rights to convert the case to a proceeding under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(a) (1982). See also In re Alpine
Lumber & Nursery, 13 Bankr. 977, 979 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981). See generaly King,
supra note 10, at 115-16.
111. See Nolan v. Judicial Council of the Third Circuit (In re Imperial "400"
Nat'l, Inc.), 481 F.2d 41, 54-55 (3d Cir.) (Lumbard, J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 486
F.2d 297 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973).
112. See generaly LoPucki, supra note 10, at 257, 259-61.
113. It cannot be denied that there are numerous disadvantages and downside
risks associated with the appointment of a trustee.
The principal disadvantages are those which Congress itself identified in the legis-
lative history, including (1) the fact that the expense of a trustee, including the ex-
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disadvantages and make the motion to appoint a trustee a
powerful tool for the protection of creditors' rights. In the
prosaic words of Bankruptcy Judge King 14 in In re Hotel
Associates, Inc. ,11 "[t]he trustee will seek to benefit all the
creditors and will bring a refreshing air of objectivity and
impartiality to a business . *.".., More specifically, the
trustee will hopefully keep accurate and trustworthy records,
penses of the additional layer of professional persons retained by the trustee, may
outweigh any benefits gained, or even preclude the successful reorganization of the
business; (2) the appointment of a trustee ousts the debtor, who is more familiar with
the business, and whose leadership may be necessary during the reorganization; (3)
the trustee will necessarily have to take time to familiarize himself or herself with the
business, which may prove detrimental to the chances for successful rehabilitation;
and (4) the too-frequent appointment of trustees may discourage debtors from seeking
the benefit of Chapter 11 until it is too late. See HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 232-
34, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6191-94. See also In re
Bonded Mailings, Inc., 20 Bankr. 781, 785 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) ("[T]he appoint-
ment of a trustee will generally necessitate the displacement of the current exper-
ienced management with those probably less familiar with the field at a time when the
enterprise itself is usually tottering on the brink of financial collapse."); supra note
104 and accompanying text. See generally Coogan, Broude & Glatt, supra note 10, at
1156; and Note, The Misbehaving Debtor, supra note 10, at 479.
Additionally, the appointment of a trustee may harm the prospects for reorganiza-
tion in those instances where long-term customers or suppliers, understandably loyal
to the debtor, may refuse to deal with a trustee or to extend credit to the trustee. This
may, in turn, cause the secured creditors to be less cooperative because of the per-
ceived loss of customers. Conversely, the trustee himself may be inadequate, or may
be too quick to seek a liquidation rather than a time-consuming rehabilitation of the
business. Even worse, the trustee's mere presence may mistakenly signal liquidation
to the creditors.
A trustee may also prove to be the wrong solution where the appointment engen-
ders fear and distrust among the employees, particularly those loyal to former man-
agement. Similarly, the appointment may cause an acute lack of cooperation from
the debtor's management or counsel.
Finally, a Chapter 11 trustee may be totally unnecessary where the appointment
of an examiner or conversion to Chapter 7 would better serve the interests of the
creditors, equity security holders, and all others.
114. Bankruptcy Judge William A. King, Jr., United States Bankruptcy Judge for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
115. 3 Bankr. 343 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980).
116. Id. at 346. See also Dardarian v. La Sherene, Inc. (In re La Sherene, Inc.), 3
Bankr. 169, 176 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980), where Bankruptcy Judge Norton, perhaps a
sailor himself, eloquently observed that a trustee will provide "a fiduciary protective
shield," and that:
The estate obviously needs a properly experienced, firm, clear-headed, far-
sighted helmsman to chart an altered, cautious and steady course, with full
command of the bridge, power, rudder, manifest, cargo and crew, if the cross-
winds and heavy seas of adversity presently confronting this business enter-
prise are to be successfully traversed.
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attempt to cooperate with creditors in the pursuit of a plan,
and provide invaluable intangible support for the reorgani-
zation potentiality of the debtor. 17 Moreover, the trustee's
objective management of the business may make it possible
to sever uneconomical loyalties to favored suppliers, custom-
ers or employees, sell off or abandon unprofitable or margi-
nal divisions or product lines, reduce overhead by cutting
out inefficiencies, waste and excesses, and otherwise instill
the confidence of the creditors, equity security holders, and
the bankruptcy judge who appointed the trustee.
This same objectivity will enable the trustee to make a
realistic decision on the issue of whether the business should
be continued, sold or liquidated." 8 In many instances, the
presence of a disinterested trustee may be critical in amelio-
rating the differences between a major creditor and the
debtor." 9 At a minimum, a trustee will have collected the
requisite information to propose and confirm a plan over the
objection of a recalcitrant creditor. 20
Moreover, because the trustee will be free of any unto-
ward conflicts of interest, he or she will be able to investigate
insider transactions,' 2' commence avoidance or preference
actions, 22 particularly where the debtor refuses to answer
any questions on the basis of a claim of privilege, 23 and in-
vestigate the relationship between the debtor and pre-
bankruptcy or postbankruptcy counsel. 124
117. LoPucki, supra note 10, at 257.
118. See supra text and accompanying notes 91 & 99-100.
119. See, e.g.,In re Bonded Mailings, Inc., 20 Bankr. 781, 786 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1982).
120. See, e.g., id.
121. See supra text and accompanying notes 78-79, & 97-98.
122. See id.
123. Cf. Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Meckstroth, (In re Meckstroth), 24 Bankr. 401,
402 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982).
124. See, e.g., Dardarian v. La Sherene, Inc. (In re La Sherene, Inc.), 3 Bankr.
169, 176 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980). In this regard, the appointment of a trustee may
produce an additional, indirect benefit in delimiting or wholly eliminating the role of
the debtor's chosen bankruptcy counsel, particularly where one cause of the debtor's
difficulties leading to the appointment of a trustee resulted from in-advised legal
counsel. See also In re Eastern Consol. Utils., Inc., 3 Bankr. 591, 593 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1980). Moreover, once a trustee is appointed, he or she is entitled to seek permis-
sion to retain counsel, and this counsel is likely to supplant the debtor's counsel, if for
no other reason, because it is well established that "[t]he debtor's attorney may not be
compensated for services which duplicate those of the trustee or the attorney for the
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In some instances, the appointment of a trustee may also
prove to be particularly advantageous where the court has
an opportunity to appoint 125 an individual or firm with
trustee." 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 327.07, at 327-33 (15th ed. 1982). See also In
re Designaire Modular Home Corp., 517 F.2d 1015, 1019 (3d Cir. 1975); In re Eureka
Upholstering Co., 48 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1931); In re Pajarito Am. Indian Art, Inc., 11
Bankr. 807, 811 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1981).
The diminished role of debtor's counsel is also attributable to the operation of the
Bankruptcy Code itself. As noted above, the interplay of sections 1107 and 1108 cre-
ates the logical inference that, once a trustee is appointed, the debtor is divested of
any power to control the debtor corporation. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107-1108 (1982). See
also In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 13 Bankr. 54, 58 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("as
far as a reorganizing debtor is concerned, the trustee possesses and controls its assets,
conducts its affairs, and subordinate management, if any, serves at the trustee's plea-
sure"), aft'd, 670 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1982). Accordingly, although the debtor and its
counsel have the right to be heard, the debtor's counsel may only be compensated for
those services which actually benefit the estate and do not duplicate the services ren-
dered by the trustee's attorney. See also In re Pajarito Am. Indian Art, Inc., II
Bankr. 807 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1981); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 330.04[3],
330.05[2][d]; Butenas, Establishing Attorney's Fees Under the New Bankruptcy Code,
87 CoMN. L.J. 237 (1982); Herzog, Fees andl1lowances in Bankruptcy, 36 CONN. B.J.
374, 381 (1962). See generally Randolph & Randolph v. Scruggs, 190 U.S. 533 (1903);
In re Hamilton Hardware Co., 11 Bankr. 326, 329-30 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981); In re
Garland Corp., 8 Bankr. 826, 830 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981); In re G.W.C. Fin. & Ins.
Servs., Inc., 8 Bankr. 122, 124 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981); In re Sumthin' Special, Inc., 2
Bankr. 743, 748 (Bankr. N.D. IlI. 1980) (the debtor's attorney "clearly cannot be com-
pensated for unnecessary work which did not benefit the estate").
Finally, although the scope of this article does not permit an in-depth analysis of
the ramifications incident to the diminished role of debtor's counsel, it would not be
surprising to find the trustee objecting to the award of any administrative expenses to
the debtor's counsel for fees incurred in resisting the appointment of a trustee, partic-
ularly when the bankruptcy court ultimately appoints a trustee "for cause." For ex-
ample, the trustee could argue that the debtor's resistance not only produced no
benefit to the estate, but "in fact obstructed and impeded the administration of the
case . . . ." In re J.V. Knitting Service, Inc., 22 Bankr. 543, 545 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1982). See also In re Laister-Kauffmann Aircraft Corp., 101 F. Supp. 950, 955-56
(E.D. Mo. 1952) (court denied fees incurred by debtor in opposing and delaying set-
tlement with government). Moreover, to the extent that the debtor's counsel's defense
of current management was actually a defense of an individual officer or director, an
award of fees may be inappropriate since the time spent inured only to the personal
benefit of these individuals, not the estate. See, e.g., In re Rosen, 25 Bankr. 81, 86
(Bankr. D.S.C. 1982). Finally, to the extent that the debtor's defense to the motion for
the appointment of a trustee is frivolous or without merit, no award of fees should be
forthcoming. See In re Underground Utils. Constr. Co., Inc., 13 Bankr. 735, 738
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981). Cf. In re Garland Corp., 8 Bankr. 826, 837 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1981) (ethical duty to defend client's interest so long as the actions are not frivolous or
devoid of substance); BANKR. R.P. 19011.
125. The appointment of a trustee is governed by sections 1104(c) or 151104(c)
depending upon whether the particular judicial district is a pilot district. 11 U.S.C.
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unique expertise,1 26 or to counterbalance an otherwise inef-
fective creditors' committee. 127 Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, the trustee may be more experienced than
debtor management in dealing with the tangle of the reor-
ganization process, thereby maximizing the chances of a suc-
cessful reorganization for the benefit of all parties to the
proceeding. In a word, the trustee is likely to be free of the
prejudices and strife within the debtor's business hierarchy,
and therefore more open to creative solutions.
§§ 1104(c), 151104(c) (1982). See supra note 70 for a discussion of the appointment
process in a pilot district.
Pursuant to sections 1104(c) and 151104(c) the court may appoint a "disinterested
person" as a trustee. Section 101(13) defines the term "disinterested person" and sec-
tion 321 governs who is eligible to serve as a trustee. The deliberate use of the word
"person" in these sections, particularly in view of the related definition of the word
"person!' in section 101(30), makes it clear that the trustee need not be an individual,
but could also be a corporation. This option may provide the court with greater flex-
ibility. For example, in the reorganization of a large real estate entity, the court may
wish to appoint a real estate management firm as trustee. Moreover, the absence of
any residency requirement allows the court to utilize the unique services of individu-
als or corporations outside the immediate judicial district. See 11 U.S.C. § 321(a)(1)
(1982). In any event, the court may not appoint a partnership or governmental unit to
act as trustee, nor the United States Trustee, the examiner, or a relative of any judge
of the court. I1 U.S.C. §§ 101(30), 321, 151104(c) (1982); BANKR. R.P. 5002.
Because there is no requirement that the court appoint a trustee from the panel of
private trustees, the prevailing party may wish to interview and submit a list of pro-
spective candidates to the court. In this way, the court will have a greater opportunity
to match a prospective trustee's abilities with the needs of the case. See also BANKR.
R.P. 2008-2010, 2012-2013 regarding the notification and acceptance of appointment;
posting and acceptance of the trustee's bond; appointment of trustees in jointly ad-
ministered cases; death, resignation or removal of trustees; and annual aggregate
compensation of individual trustees. The appropriate amount of the trustee's bond
and the sufficiency of the surety of such a bond is determined by the court under
section 322(b).
126. For example, in In re Covenant Living Centers, Inc., No. 81-02663 (Bankr.
E.D. Wis. Nov. 12, 1981) (unpublished opinion), the bankruptcy court appointed a
trustee with unique and invaluable expertise in the management and rehabilitation of
failing lifetime care retirement centers.
127. Id. See also LoPucki, supra note 10, at 249. Conversely, the courts have
held that creditors' committees have a right to commence adversary proceedings, or
intervene in existing proceedings, where the trustee has been lax or ineffectual. See
generally Blain & Erne, Creditors' Committees Under Chapter 11 of the United States
Bankruptcy Code: Creation, Composition, Powers and Duties, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 491
(1984) and cases cited therein.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Although the congressional intent embodied in section
1104(a) and the case law emerging under that section places
a heavy burden on the party seeking to displace debtor man-
agement, where justified, the appointment of a trustee may
immeasurably enhance and facilitate the reorganization pro-
cess. The right to have a trustee appointed, whether for
cause or for the best interests of creditors, equity security
holders and other interests of the estate, serves as an impor-
tant counterweight to the debtor's otherwise broad right to
remain in possession at the expense of the creditors and eq-
uity security holders. A motion for the appointment of a
trustee is an important remedy that cannot be overlooked,
and which may very well serve as the focal point for a suc-
cessful reorganization.
